Edelman, Lauren,
Christopher Uggen, and Howard Erlanger.
1999. “The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth.” American Journal of Sociology
105:406-54.
ABSTRACT
Most
accounts of organizational response to law treat law as largely exogenous, and
emphasize organizations' response to law.
We propose a model of endogeneity between organizations, the
professions, and legal institutions. We
suggest that organizations and the professions strive
to construct rational responses to law, enabled by "rational myths"
or stories about appropriate solutions that are themselves modeled after the
public legal order. Courts, in turn,
recognize and legitimate organizational structures that mimic the legal form,
thus conferring legal and market benefits upon organizational structures that
began as gestures of compliance. Thus
market rationality can follow from rationalized myths: the professions promote
a particular compliance strategy, organizations adopt this strategy to reduce
costs and symbolize compliance, and courts adjust judicial constructions of
fairness to include these emerging organizational practices. To illustrate this model, we present a case study
of equal employment opportunity (EEO) grievance procedures.